This paper explores the factors which eliminated the nonperforming loan (NPL) problem in Malaysia and Thailand following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The number of NPLs which expanded in the aftermath of the crisis, has since declined in most Southeast Asian countries. Although previous studies have explored the causes of the increase in NPL numbers, few have analysed the factors that contributed to the reduction in their number in Asia. In Malaysia and Thailand, authorities put in place a number of measures to manage NPLs. As a vehicle to acquire NPLs from banks, Malaysia established the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (Danaharta) in 1998, while Thailand established the Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC) in 2001. We analyse whether the characteristic features of banks, improvements in macroeconomic conditions, and facilities for purchasing loans caused a reduction in the number of NPLs in Malaysia and Thailand. The results suggest that selling loans to a public asset management company was effective in reducing the number of NPLs in Thailand. However, while macroeconomic conditions influenced the decline in NPL ratios in Thailand, in Malaysia, good performing commercial banks and large commercial and investment banks generally had smaller NPL ratios throughout and following the crisis.
Introduction
Since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, governmental authorities throughout Southeast Asia have continued to pursue reform of their banking systems. In Southeast Asia, a sound banking system is particularly important, because a significant number of companies rely heavily on bank loans for financing. Nonperforming loans (NPLs) in particular can become a major problem for a banking system, as evidenced in recent experiences around the world. One example is the substantial losses throughout the US banking sector which resulted from the decline in housing prices in the US, itself fueled by the large number of subprime mortgages and NPLs. The collapse of land prices in Japan in the 1990s, which escalated the number of NPLs via real estate collateral loans and provoked a banking system crisis, is another. Some Southeast Asian countries have experienced similar problems, notably after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, when the massive increase in NPLs wreaked havoc on the region's banking system. 1 Consequently some banks faced bankruptcy, and the number of bank loans declined, causing macroeconomic conditions to worsen significantly.
The governments of the Asian countries affected by the 1997 crisis have sought to rebuild their banking systems by restructuring and consolidating domestic banks. In addition, government authorities attempted to eliminate NPLs by purchasing them from banks.
2 These measures may have had contributed to the reduction in number of NPLs. 3 Since 1999, macroeconomic conditions have improved, and NPLs have gradually declined in most Southeast Asian countries. This paper explores whether the characteristic features of banks, the purchase of loans by NPL management facilities, and improvements in macroeconomic conditions caused the reduction in NPLs in both Malaysia and Thailand.
It is important to discuss the policies that eliminated NPLs in Southeast Asia because this problem may also arise in other emerging economies. Although many studies have highlighted how NPLs increased in the first instance and have 1 Ito (1999) noted that real estate prices increased when the economy expanded in the 1990s before the 1997 Asian crisis. 2 Fung et al. (2004) compared government-established and government-owned asset management companies in East Asia since the late 1990s. They argue that these asset management companies have many common characteristics. Bonin and Huang (2001) discussed the importance of the establishment of asset management companies in China. 3 Although selling NPLs should reduce the amount of NPLs in each bank, NPLs could increase when banks subsequently increase loans to less creditworthy companies.
No. 398, 2012 2 discussed solutions to the problem, few have analysed why NPLs declined in Asia and in particular the factors that contributed to the reduction of NPLs in Southeast Asian countries. In Japan, Hosono (2010) has investigated factors which caused NPLs to decrease. In this study, Hosono (2010) looked at factors which increased the number of NPLs as explanatory variables in the regression, and showed that land prices were an important contributing factor in the decline of NPLs. In other work, Boudriga et al. (2009) employed aggregate banking, financial, economic, and legal environment data from a panel of 59 countries over the period 2002-06 and empirically analysed the cross-country determinants of nonperforming loans. This study suggested that higher capital adequacy ratios and prudent provisioning policies appeared to reduce the level of problem loans. 4 Previous studies have discussed the incidence of and solutions for NPLs and some studies have described the processes of and factors influencing the NPL problem in Asia. For example, Ueda (2000) analysed the causes of NPLs in Japanese banks in the 1990s, including the role of real estate related loans, the influence of financial liberalisation, inefficient bank management, and moral hazards relating to certain safety nets. Hu et al. (2004) examined the influence of deregulation on the NPLs of a panel of Taiwanese commercial banks during the period 1996-99, identifying a relationship between the number of NPLs and the total loan amount (hereafter, the NPL ratio) and government shareholdings. This study concluded that as the percentage of government shareholdings in a bank increased, the NPL rate initially fell and then increased thereafter. Moreover, they found a negative correlation between bank size and the NPL ratio.
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The governments of Malaysia and Thailand undertook a number of measures to manage NPLs in their respective jurisdictions, although the periods of establishment differ. To acquire NPLs, Malaysia established the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (or Danaharta) as an asset management company in 1998, while Thailand founded the Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC) in 2001. 6 The IMF (2004) suggests that one reason why Thailand instituted the 4 Hasan and Wall (2004) analyzed the determining factors in loan loss reserves in the US, Canada, and Japan. Also in the US, Berger and De Young (1997) analytically explored the relationships between loan quality, cost efficiency, and bank capital. They suggested that cost efficiency was an important indicator of future problem loans and banks. 5 Sinkey et al. (1991) analyzed the loan-loss factor and suggested that banks with adequate capital tended to have lower loss rates. 6 In addition, after the Asian crisis, some banks in Malaysia and Thailand received capital restructuring of its banks' NPLs much later than in many other Asian countries was because of the relatively late establishment of an agency to acquire nonperforming assets. 7 However, no studies have considered whether the establishment of these agencies was a more efficient solution to the problem of NPLs than simply waiting for an improvement in macroeconomic and/or bank conditions. 8 Given that the Malaysian and Thai economies had recovered by 1999, this paper focuses on three factors relating to the decline of NPLs in these countries: namely, (i) the purchase of loans by facilities for managing nonperforming assets, (ii) the influence of bank characteristics, and (iii) macroeconomic indicators on the decline in NPL ratios in both countries. Following Ueda (2000) and Hosono (2010) , we employ a panel regression analysis of domestic bank data to examine the factors affecting the decline in NPL ratios.
9
The results suggest that the purchase of loans by public asset management companies was effective in stimulating a decline in the number of NPLs in Thailand. This implies that Thai banks could have reduced their NPLs sooner if the government had established TAMC earlier (that is, before 2001). In Malaysia, although banking loans and NPLs may have increased while Danaharta purchased loans, it is difficult to deny the influence of the selling of loans. While the improvement in macroeconomic conditions reduced NPL ratios in Thailand, this effect was especially clear in the period when TAMC did not buy NPLs from Thai commercial banks. By contrast, in Malaysia, large commercial and investment banks and good performing commercial banks had smaller NPL ratios.
injections. 7 The IMF suggests that it is difficult to evaluate the progress of TAMC because of insufficient information disclosure, although they do concede that the notional statistics illustrate that TAMC played a progressive role in the restructuring process for nonperforming loans. 8 Although Terada-Hagiwara and Pasadilla (2004) support the effectiveness of asset management companies in relation to the Thai NPL problem, they also examined whether asset management companies increased moral hazard in banks. 9 Relocating NPLs to asset management facilities may potentially and efficiently reduce the stock of NPLs. However, the current paper analyzes only the effects of selling loans on the decline in the number of NPLs in each bank and does not consider the efficiency effects of the decline in the number of NPLs nationwide. Therefore, we do not include the impact of relocating NPLs to public facilities on the burden of the government sector and macroeconomic conditions. No. 398, 2012 4 The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews developments in the restructuring of NPLs in the Malaysian and Thai banking sectors after the 1997 Asian financial crisis and explains the roles of Danaharta and TAMC. This section also describes the trends in the NPL ratio, land prices, and GDP growth in both countries. Section 3 discusses the hypotheses to be examined using panel data for domestic banks. Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
Nonperforming loans, asset management companies, and the macroeconomy

Banking sector reform and the role of Danaharta and TAMC
In the aftermath of the Asian Crisis, authorities in crisis-affected countries attempted to address the problems of bank capitalization, governance, risk management, and operational inefficiencies. Another important problem they faced was the proliferation of NPLs. Many authorities temporarily nationalised banks. Their efforts also included bank closure and consolidation. In addition, Malaysia and Thailand established Danaharta and TAMC, respectively, as vehicles to restructure NPLs.
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In 1998, the Malaysian authorities established Danaharta as a public asset management company. The government funded Khazanah Nasional, the national investment arm for Malaysian government loans, granted loans to the agency. These loans were guaranteed through the issuance of Malaysian government zerocoupon bonds. Danaharta bought NPLs at market value, as appraised by independent auditors.
11 Table 1 shows that the value of NPLs purchased by
Danaharta from banks and financial companies was most significant in 1999 and 2000. The level of NPLs also declined from 1999 to 2000, and the NPL ratio has since declined every year after 1998, with the exception of 2001.
The consolidation of financial institutions is another measure which aims to improve the performance of the banking system. While there were some consolidations of commercial and merchant banks and finance companies, Bank Negara also provided liquidity to weakened financial institutions.
12 In addition to this, some banks and their finance company subsidiaries were merged. As a result, 
An overview of NPLs, real estate prices, and GDP growth
This section graphically illustrates the fluctuations in NPLs, real estate prices, real GDP growth, and the value of purchased NPLs in Malaysia and Thailand. Figures 1 and 4 depict the ratio of NPLs to total loans and the real GDP growth rates, respectively. Figures 2 and 3 portray the housing price indexes in Malaysia and Thailand, respectively. Figure 5 shows the value of NPLs and loans purchased No. 398, 2012 by the asset management facility in Malaysia. Figure 6 depicts these same values for Thailand. Tables 2-1 and 2-2 provide further details on the loans purchased by the respective asset management companies and the NPL ratios of the Malaysian and Thai banks, respectively.
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As shown in Figure 1 , Malaysia's NPL ratio increased to about 13.6% in 1998. Since the crisis, Malaysian banks have improved their overall asset quality, and the NPL ratio has declined accordingly. Although the NPL ratio increased again in 2001, it decreased in the other years as a result of other forms of bank restructuring, e.g., through write-offs and asset sale programs. Figure 2 plots the fluctuation in the Malaysian house price index. As shown, house prices in Malaysia increased until 1997, going by about 18.3% in 1995 alone. The rate of change in house prices declined in 1998 and 1999 and increased thereafter. Figure 4 suggests that the Malaysian real GDP growth rate was negative in 1998 and lower in 2001 than in the other years. Together, these figures indicate that the decline in the NPL ratio and the increase in both house prices and the growth of real GDP were similar following the 1997 crisis. After the 1997 crisis, with the possible exception of 2001, economic growth and real estate prices increased, and NPLs declined in Malaysia. Conversely, in 2001, the GDP growth rate and real estate prices decreased, and the NPL ratio increased.
As shown in Figure 1 , the NPL ratio in Thailand, which in 1998 had been about 43%, decreased to about 7.3% in 2007. Although the high NPL ratio of 1998 and 1999 had declined in 2000, recovery was slower in Thailand than in Malaysia. In 2006, the NPL ratio for private banks in Thailand remained higher than in Malaysia. The return to NPL status slowed after 2000, and the banking sector has generally become more profitable since 2003. However, we should note that the definition of NPLs changed in 2002, and this definition encompassed more NPLs as a result. Figure 3 demonstrates that house prices in Thailand increased until 1997, except in 1994. The rate of increase declined in 1998 and 1999 and increased again in 2002. As Figure 4 shows, the real GDP growth rate was negative in both 1997 and 1998. Since 1999, GDP growth in Thailand has remained positive. These observations indicate that the gradual decline in the NPL ratio, the increase in house prices, and the increase in the GDP growth rate were similar during the period after the 1997 financial crisis. Since 2003, economic growth and real estate prices in Thailand have increased further, and NPLs have once again declined. 
Empirical analysis
Methodology
In this analysis, we examine the influence of bank characteristics, the purchases of nonperforming loans by asset management facilities, and macroeconomic indicators on the decline in NPLs in both Malaysia and Thailand. The analysis employs panel regression techniques, following previous studies that have focused on the relationship between the NPL ratio and other variables, such as the number of loans acquired, macroeconomic conditions, and bank performance. 18 We focus on the influence of these same variables on the NPL ratio for domestic commercial and investment banks in Malaysia and domestic commercial banks in Thailand.
Following Ueda (2000) , Hu et al. (2004), and Hosono (2010) , the reduced-form regression equation for NPL ratios is as follows:
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where it NPL is the ratio of NPLs to total loans (for bank i in period t), 20 We lag all explanatory variables one period. Table 3 provides the sample means and standard deviations of the variables.
If low-risk and large banks could eliminate NPLs and increase the number of new loans, the NPL ratio of these banks would be smaller than those of high-risk and small banks and the expected sign of the coefficients for the bank characteristic variables would be negative.
21 Therefore, we expect the sign of the estimated 19 We employed either a fixed or a random effects least squares regression technique according to the results of a Hausman test. The equation therefore includes either fixed or random effects. 20 Because we omit inflation from the rate of change in the real estate price index, Land is in real values. 21 Some theories assert that well-capitalized banks face lower insolvency risk and lower expected bankruptcy costs, and that a higher bank equity ratio implies lower risk. A high coefficients for Size and Equity or ROA to be negative when the disposal of NPLs depends on bank characteristics. In other words, if the banking sector reforms undertaken by the Malaysian and Thai authorities resulted in banks becoming sounder and larger after the Asian crisis and extensively eliminated NPLs, the signs of the estimated coefficients for the bank characteristic variables would be negative.
Because loans sold to the public asset management company can contribute to clearing off NPLs, the NPL ratios of banks can decline through the purchase of these loans by asset management companies. As a result, we expect the estimated coefficient for AMC to be negative. 22 Similarly, an increase in real estate prices can reduce NPLs through increases in collateral values, and high real GDP growth rates can transform some NPLs to normal loans by improving corporate performance. Therefore, favorable macroeconomic variables can reduce the number of NPLs. Accordingly, we anticipate that the estimated coefficients for Growth and Land will also be negative.
Along with these variables, we include dummy variables as constants and as slope coefficients. In order to better explore the influencing factors when banks did not sell loans, we specify these dummies for periods in which the asset management companies did not purchase NPLs. Although the transfer of bad loans can directly reduce NPLs, it is difficult to demonstrate exactly how the elimination of the NPLs could have taken place without the asset management companies purchasing the loans. Therefore, to consider the NPL situation as if there were no asset management companies in Malaysia or Thailand, we also investigate the effects of macroeconomic conditions and bank characteristics on the NPL ratio during the period when loan transfers did not occur. The regression equation used in this analysis is as follows:
where Dum is a dummy variable taking a value of one in the period without the level of ROA also implies a lower default risk. 22 The possibility exists that bad banks sell more loans than good banks. Although this means that the coefficient can be positive, the regression results do not support this, as discussed later.
No. 398, 2012 purchase of NPLs by an asset management company and zero otherwise. Consequently, the dummy period in the regression for Malaysia is the period 2001-05 while that for Thailand is the period 1998-2001. 23 In the regression analysis of equation [2] , the variables are otherwise the same as in equation [1] .
Although the regression equations [1] and [2] use one-period lagged variables as a means of avoiding the problems of endogeneity, we can assume that the loans purchased by the asset management company and the macroeconomic variables also influence the results in any given year. Therefore, we also estimate the models using the dynamic panel regression method in Arellano and Bond (1991) in place of lagged variables. This is a generalized method of moments (GMM)-type estimation and specifies the equations in first differences with orthogonality conditions. 24 The regression equations used in this analysis are as follows:
The specification of all variables is otherwise the same as in equations [1] and [2].
Data and terms
Given the constraints on data availability, we consider the periods 1998 -2005 in Malaysia and 1998 -2006 in Thailand. The periods during which loan transfers did not take place were -05 in Malaysia and 1998 -2000 in Thailand. The domestic bank panel data, including those for NPLs, equity, ROA, total loans, and total assets, are taken from the Bankscope database. The data for each bank that sold loans to a public asset management company are taken from Danaharta's operation reports in Malaysia and the annual reports of each individual bank in Thailand. The macroeconomic variables, including the GDP growth rate and the real estate price index, are from the databases of the CEIC Data Company Ltd. In the regression, we specify the housing price indexes as the real estate price.
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The analysis specifies data for domestic commercial and investment banks in Malaysia and domestic commercial banks only in Thailand. 26 Consequently, to obtain consistency in the statistical tests for Malaysia, we conduct separate regressions including both commercial and investment banks and commercial banks alone. 27 We exclude banks from our samples that merged or ceased to operate after the crisis. 28 Our final sample comprises 14 Malaysian domestic commercial and investment banks, including 9 commercial banks, and 10 Thai domestic commercial banks. The coefficients for Growth and Land are not negative. 31 While the coefficients for Equity and ROA are not significant, the coefficients for Size are significant and negative. In Malaysian commercial banks, the coefficients for Equity, ROA, and two of the coefficients for Size are significantly negative.
Regression results
In Thailand, the estimated coefficients for loans purchased by TAMC are significant and negative. 32 One of the coefficients for the real estate price index is 25 Because the house price index for Thailand also includes housing land, the index is conceptually close to the real estate price index. 26 The term "domestic bank" covers banks listed by local authorities. 27 In Malaysia, most of the commercial banks are larger than the investment banks. 28 We included the BankThai Public Company in Thailand as it merged in 2009. We excluded the Standard Chartered Bank in Thailand because we could not obtain data on its sale of loans to TAMC. A few commercial banks founded toward the middle of the 2000s are also not included. 29 Although there is a possibility of a correlation between some of the explanatory variables, the results of the regressions excluding one of the possibly correlated variables do not differ substantially from the original regression results. 30 The data on NPLs and the balance sheet information for each bank do not suggest that the larger banks had smaller NPL ratios before authorities began attempting to eliminate the NPLs. 31 The estimated coefficients for Land are significantly positive. We surmise that one reason for this finding is a situation in which NPL ratios and real estate prices declined in 1999 and increased in 2001. 32 Because the definition of NPLs changed in 2002 and the number of NPLs increased, we also estimate an equation that includes a dummy variable for the year 2002 in the analyses significantly negative, while the coefficients for GDP growth rate are also significant and negative. The estimated coefficients for Equity and ROA are both insignificant. The coefficients for Size are significant and negative in all tests. This implies that faster economic growth, an increase in real estate prices, and an increase in loans sold to TAMC reduced the NPL ratio in Thailand. In addition, large banks may have had lower NPL ratios. Table 5 depicts the results for the regressions of equation [2] for the dummy period in which banks did not sell loans to either Danaharta or TAMC. These results are similar to the regression results without the dummy variables. The estimated coefficients for Size are significant and negative in Malaysia. In addition, the coefficients for the Size dummies are significantly negative. This means that large banks had lower NPL ratios than small banks over the period 1998-2000. Remarkably, this persisted after 2001. The constant dummy variables are significantly positive in the tests for Malaysian banks. The positive constant dummy implies that NPL ratios increased in the period 2001-05 during which the asset management company did not purchase NPLs.
In Thailand, the coefficients for loans purchased by TAMC are significant and negative. While the estimated coefficients for Land are significantly negative and the corresponding coefficient dummies positive, the coefficient dummies for Growth are significantly negative. This implies that the real GDP ratio was more central to the decline in NPL ratios during the period 1998-2000, the period before TAMC began buying NPLs, than in the period after. Table 6 details the results of the dynamic panel regressions of equation [3] . For Malaysian commercial and investment banks, one of the coefficients for loans sold to Danaharta and two of the coefficients for Size are significantly negative. However, the overidentifying restriction is not satisfied for this regression. In Malaysian commercial banks, two of the coefficients for loans sold to Danaharta are significant and negative. The estimated coefficients for Equity, ROA, Size, and Growth are also significantly negative. This implies that low-risk commercial banks had lower NPL ratios and that higher economic growth was important for the decline in NPLs for Malaysian commercial banks.
Coefficients for loans purchased by TAMC are significant and negative in Thailand. One of the coefficients for the GDP growth rate is significantly negative, for Thailand. The estimated coefficients for this dummy variable are never significant. as are the coefficients for the real estate price index. While the coefficient for ROA is significantly negative, the estimated coefficients for Size are statistically insignificant. This implies that high economic growth, an increase in real estate prices, and an increase in loans sold to TAMC reduced the NPL ratio of banks in Thailand. Table 7 details the results of the dynamic regressions of equation [4] for the dummy period in which banks did not sell loans to the asset management companies. For Malaysian commercial and investment banks, some of the estimated slope coefficients for Size and the dummies of Size are significantly negative and the constant dummy variables are significantly positive. However, the overidentifying restriction is also unsatisfied for this regression. In Malaysian commercial banks, the coefficients for ROA, Equity, Size, and one of the coefficients for Growth are significant and negative. The constant dummy variables are significantly positive and two of the Size dummies are significantly negative.
In Thailand, the coefficients for loans purchased by TAMC and ROA are significant and negative. While the estimated coefficients for Land are not significant, one of the coefficient dummies for Growth is significantly negative. This suggests that real GDP was important for the fall in NPL ratios during 1998-2000.
Influence of changes in bank loans on the NPL ratios
We also test for the influence of bank characteristics, the purchase of loans by nonperforming asset management facilities, and macroeconomic conditions on changes in the loans for each bank. The regression on changes in bank loans can explain whether these influences on the ratios of NPLs to total loans arise from changes in loans (the denominator in the ratio). The rates of change in bank loans serve as dependent variables, and the explanatory variables are the same as in the tests for the NPL ratios in equation [1] . 33 If the signs of the coefficients for AMC and the macroeconomic conditions variables are positive, their effects could increase bank loans and decrease the NPL ratio. Table 8 shows the results of the panel regression of the rate of change in loans of domestic banks in Malaysia and Thailand. For Malaysian commercial and investment banks, the coefficients for Size are significant and negative. This implies that large banks reduced both loans and NPLs during the regression period in Malaysia, because the regression for the NPL ratio showed that large banks had lower NPL ratios. Meanwhile, the coefficient for loans sold to Danaharta is significant and positive. This means that the purchase of loans by Danaharta may have increased banking loans and NPLs expanded during this same period because most of the estimated coefficients for AMC were not significant in the regression result for the NPL ratios. In the test for Malaysian commercial banks, the estimated coefficients for Equity are significantly positive. This indicates that commercial banks with high equity ratios reduced their NPL ratios primarily through an increase in the number of loans (the denominator in the ratio).
For Thai banks, the coefficients for macroeconomic variables are significantly positive and the coefficients for loans purchased by TAMC are not significant. This implies that improvements in macroeconomic conditions reduced the NPL ratios primarily through an increase in the number of loans (the denominator) and that selling loans to TAMC reduced NPL ratios primarily through a reduction in the number of NPLs remaining on each bank's books (the numerator).
Implications of regression results
These findings support the argument that an improvement in macroeconomic circumstances and the purchase of NPLs may have affected the NPL problem in Thailand. In Malaysia, individual bank characteristics, notably bank size, exerted an enormous influence on the NPL problem. In addition, good performing Malaysian commercial banks also reduced their NPL ratios. 34 It is possible that the increase in loans sold to Danaharta affected the NPL ratio, because some coefficients that were significant and the NPL ratio rose after the period in which the asset management company ceased purchasing loans. This is consistent with the high NPL ratios of most Malaysian banks from 2001 to 2003, as shown in Table 2 
Conclusion
This study investigated the impact of variables that describe the characteristics of banks, the purchase of nonperforming loans by asset management facilities, and macroeconomic indicators on the decline of NPLs in Malaysia and Thailand. Both countries experienced the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and faced similar problems with the amount of NPLs. In response, the Malaysian and Thai authorities established respective public asset management companies and attempted to reform their banking systems using various measures and policies to eliminate NPLs, including bank closure and consolidation. In addition, improved macroeconomic conditions in both countries after the crisis could also have affected the NPL problem. However, until now, the factors influencing the reduction in NPLs in the banking sectors of Southeast Asia have not been the subject of empirical attention. It is important to investigate these factors now in order to address similar problems if they were to reoccur in the future.
The panel regression results suggest that selling loans to public asset management companies was effective in reducing NPLs, especially in Thailand. This implies that Thai banks could have reduced their NPLs sooner if TAMC had existed before 2001. In Malaysia, although NPLs may have increased during the period in which Danaharta purchased loans, we cannot deny the existence of its influence in selling loans.
In addition, the results reveal that some variables measuring bank risk are significant in Malaysia. In Malaysia, domestic banks with larger assets have smaller NPL ratios. This suggests that large Malaysian banks could eliminate NPLs sooner than their smaller counterparts, and this trend was more significant in the period in which banks did not sell loans to Danaharta. In addition, commercial banks which perform well, generally have smaller NPL ratios in Malaysia. If banking reforms after the crisis contributed to creating sounder banks, this may have affected the decline in NPLs for banks and the overall improvement in the domestic banking sector in Malaysia.
While macroeconomic conditions caused the decrease in the NPL ratio principally by increasing loans in Thailand, the effect was more significant than in Malaysia. 35 In addition, if the Thai authorities had not established TAMC, solving the NPL problem would have largely depended on the general improvement in macroeconomic conditions. This implies that macroeconomic recovery from the financial crisis of 1997 affected largely the reduction in NPL ratios and that macroeconomic policy may have had played an important role in resolving the NPL problem in Thailand. 
